主题：Optimal Tax Policy with Misreporting: Theory, and Evidence from Real Estate
主讲人：Santosh Anagol，宾夕法尼亚大学沃顿商学院副教授
时间：12月17日（周三）上午10:00-11:30
地点：4-101教室
语言：英文
摘要：
We develop a model of optimal taxation and enforcement when policymakers seek both welfare maximization and “tax accuracy,” where taxpayers remit the amount statutorily owed under truthful reporting. We characterize the optimal combination of tax rate and enforcement stringency. We apply the framework to the Mumbai real-estate market, a setting with widespread misreporting and a transparent enforcement instrument: government-specified guidance values set the minimum required tax base. Bunching evidence plus third party estimates of market values suggest under-reporting relative to market values, consistent with the government setting low guidance values to avoid the problem of overpayments. Structural estimates based on the observed level of guidance values suggest the government is willing to give up |2.12 in tax revenue to avoid charging taxpayers |1 more than their statutory liability.
主讲人介绍：
Santosh Anagol is an Associate Professor in the Business Economics and Public Policy Department at Wharton. His research focuses on financial market issues in emerging markets. One recent project studies how the regulation of fees has shaped the Indian mutual fund industry. Another project studies the behavior of life insurance agents and how they respond to changes in regulatory policy. His dissertation studied inefficiencies in the Indian market for dairy cows and buffaloes, which are commonly purchased by microfinance borrowers. His teaching focuses on the effects of economic regulation on business. He received his PhD from Yale University in 2009 and his undergraduate degree from Stanford in 2002, and was a Fulbright Scholar to India in 2002-2003.
